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1. Introduction 
 
Zipcar calls itself a “car club network.”1  A person can, for a small fee, become a member of 
this network, enabling them to rent, using an app, one of the many Zipcar vehicles that populate 
the streets of cities and the car-parks of airports.  The rates are low, and the cars can be rented 
for as little as an hour – for a trip to the supermarket, to move some furniture, for a day out.  It 
is plausible that for many, particularly those living in the urban areas where Zipcar concentrates 
its business, renting cars through Zipcar could replace owning a car. In such areas, Zipcars are 
abundant and conveniently located, meaning that people can reliably access a car when they 
want to. 
 Renting is a common property relation – most of us, at some point in our lives, rent 
goods – and it is becoming more common.2  It is also a controversial property relation.  Whilst 
there are notable popular defences of renting,3 and whilst we might welcome the way in which 
organisations like Zipcar makes renting certain goods (like cars) easier, with respect to other 
goods a rise in rental is viewed with concern. In the US and the UK, the rise in the numbers of 
people renting housing because they cannot afford to buy is being treated as a crisis, not a 
satisfactory state of affairs.4 Whilst some concerns here are about the conditions of renting, this 
is not, I think, the whole story: worries about “Generation Rent” track the sense in these places 
that, even under decent conditions, renting is an inferior means of exercising property rights 
over certain goods.5 
																																																						
* Particular thanks go to David Miller, Zofia Stemplowska, and members of the Centre for the Study of Social 
Justice seminar series, University of Oxford.  
1 ‘What is Zipcar?’ at <https://www.zipcar.co.uk/how>, accessed 17/10/2017. 
2 See, for example, Anna Nicolaou and Mark Vandevelde, “Retailers respond to rise in renting clothes and 
goods,” Financial Times online, 22 December 2017, available at <https://www.ft.com/content/ca2e1860-e425-
11e7-8b99-0191e45377ec>, accessed 13/3/2018. 
3 In particular, Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers defend renting as a species of what they call “collaborative 
consumption.” Botsman and Rogers What’s mine is yours: the rise of collaborative consumption (New York: 
Harper Business, 2010)  
4 See, for example, Emma Munbodh, “‘We’ll be stuck in Generation Rent forever’ - 34 million renters say 
government is not doing enough to get them on the property ladder,” The Mirror online, 8 August 2017, 
available at <https://www.mirror.co.uk/money/well-stuck-generation-rent-forever-10946424>, accessed 
12/4/2018. 
5 This is not to say that renting housing is not viewed with the same concern everywhere.  
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 In spite of the fact that renting is both an (increasingly) common and a controversial 
way to exercise property rights over goods, there is little treatment of renting in political and 
legal philosophy. Indeed, there is so little treatment of the relation that it is often not 
distinguished in discussion from other “limited interests” (interests, that is, more limited than 
ownership) one may exercise over goods.6  The aim of this paper is to remedy this neglect, by 
offering a normative evaluation of renting.7  I argue that we should want to organise much 
more of our access to goods than we currently do through rental, rather than ownership.8  My 
claims focus on a certain class of goods: personal goods.9 Personal goods, here, means housing, 
personal means of transport, and the goods that typically make up most individuals’ and 
families’ belongings: clothes and accessories, furniture, crockery, knick-knacks, electronic 
items, the paraphernalia associated with hobbies and interests, children’s toys, and so on.  I 
focus here, in the first instance, on personal goods as these are the class of goods with respect 
to which the present controversy regarding a rise in renting pertains. The upshot of the 
argument is that we should want each person to significantly increase the proportion of their 
personal goods that they access through rental. 
 The type of renting defended, however, is important.  I defend the claim that we should 
want each person to significantly increase the proportion of their personal goods they access 
through what I call decent renting.  Decent renting provides renters with important additional 
rights and powers, compared to renting normally understood. 
In what follows, I offer two arguments for the claim that we should want to organise 
much more of our access to personal goods than we currently do through “decent” rental, rather 
than ownership, “The Community Argument” and “The Mitigation Argument.”  The two 
arguments elaborate, in different ways, the claim that organising much more of our access to 
goods through decent rental helps us realise values and ends we have reason to want to realise.  
The paper also considers the plausibility of an important concern that might be raised against 
																																																						
6 Ownership, in contrast, gets extensive treatment. Some examples among many include Jeremy Waldron The 
Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), A. Honoré, “Ownership,” in Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, Ed A. Guest (London: Oxford University Press, 1961): 107-47, John Christman, The Myth of 
Property: Towards an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership (Oxford University Press, 1994). Some works discuss a 
range of property interests but offer no focus on rental, specifically.  See J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
7 Although it is unfortunately beyond the scope of any single paper to offer a full normative evaluation of this 
property relation. 
8 I assume for the purposes of this paper that, perhaps with the exception of housing, most people currently 
access the majority of their personal goods via ownership. 
9 A little more is written about renting other categories of good.  For example, James Grunebaum’s work 
includes proposals that access to land and natural resources be organised through a system of rental.  See his 
Private Ownership (New York: Routledge & Kegal Paul, 1987). 
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a proposal that individuals should increase the proportion of personal goods that they rent: that 
if this occurred, we would sacrifice important benefits associated with more widespread 
ownership. 
The arguments of this paper assume a particular context.  This is a context of (a) 
materialism, that is, a context in which we place certain kinds of significance on people’s 
possessions; and (b) consumerism, that is, a context in which individuals abundantly consume 
the relevant goods.  Making arguments that hold in this kind of context is highly relevant, of 
course, since it means that the arguments apply, at present, in many societies. 
The focus of the paper is on arguing for the desirability of a state of affairs in which 
individuals rent a much greater proportion of their personal goods than they do at present.  This 
leaves open two further questions. First, to what extent, if any, is it desirable that ownership be 
retained with respect to (certain) personal goods?  Second, how might the state act to facilitate 
an increase in renting?  Whilst these are significant questions, addressing them is the task of a 
longer work. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  First, I consider the prima facie case for considering 
renting as a potential alternative to ownership of personal goods: namely, that renting provides 
us with the kind of control over objects that those who defend ownership take to be important.  
Second, I offer a definition of the renting relation, and characterise “decent” renting.  Third, I 
set out The Community Argument and the Mitigation Argument.  Finally, I consider an 
objection to my proposal that we organise more of our access to goods through rental, rather 
than ownership. 
 
2. The prima facie case 
 
The prima facie case for considering rental as a plausible alternative to ownership when it 
comes to personal goods is generated by consideration of the kind of argument typically given 
in favour of having a system of property rights at all.  In order to successfully carry out our 
plans and projects, it is argued, we need to be able to use resources in the external world.  
Specifically, we need to be able to use those resources involved in our plans and projects.10  
However, simply being furnished with the entitlement to use certain resources is typically not 
enough: if others can take the resource in question from me, either whilst I am using it, or as 
																																																						
10 I associate contemporary versions of this argument with John T. Sanders, “Projects and Property,” in Robert 
Nozick, edited by David Schmidtz, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 34-58, and, more recently 
with Charles Beitz, “Property and Time,” Journal of Political Philosophy 26(4), 2018: 419-440. 
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soon as I am not physically in possession of it, then I lack reliable access to that item, 
significantly diminishing my ability to incorporate it into my plans and projects. In order to 
ensure reliable access, individuals need to be able to exercise certain kinds of property rights 
over the resources involved in their plans and projects.  The property rights in question need to 
be those that ensure individuals can exercise control that is exclusive, secure and 
“intertemporal” – that is, extended over a period of time – over the resource in question.11 
It is often taken to be the case that the relevant property rights are ownership rights.  
Ownership rights certainly do provide the relevant type of control over resources.  However, 
renting, too, is a way of exercising property rights over external resources that can provide us 
with secure, exclusive, intertemporal control.   Whilst this is, in so many words, acknowledged 
by those who set out the above argument, it is typically taken to be ownership rights that are 
the property relation most suitable for protecting our interest in carrying out our plans and 
projects.12  This might be because ownership permits us to retain control of the item in question 
for as long as we wish – that is, for as long as our plans and projects are ongoing.13  However, 
as those who defend the argument in question acknowledge, as long as we know for how long 
we will exercise the relevant control over objects, and as long as the length of time in question 
is not very short, more limited interests will do, since we can make plans that take into account 
a more limited time period.14   
Renting, therefore, is a prima facie alternative to ownership, if we are interested in the 
kind of property rights that will protect our ability to carry out our plans and projects.  Both 
can provide secure, exclusive, intertemporal control.   Answering the question of how we 
should want to organise our access to goods, then, requires us to consider other features of 
renting and ownership.  It is the purpose of this paper to argue for the advantages of an increase 
in renting.  
 
3. Renting and “decent” renting, defined 
 
In a brief outline, let me characterise two property relations: renting and “decent” renting.15 
																																																						
11 Beitz, “Property and Time,” 9. 
12 Ibid., 10. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Elsewhere, I have offered characterisations of renting, and gone some way to defining what I here call 
“decent” renting. Here, I offer further development of these characterisations.  See, in particular, Katy Wells, 
“The Right to Housing,” Political Studies (2018), Online First and Katy Wells, “The Right to Personal 
Property,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 15(4), 2016: 358-378. 
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 To see what is involved in renting an item, consider the case of an individual who rents 
a television for several months.  This individual will, for the period of rental, be able to use the 
television as he or she wishes, so long as they do not alter or damage it. He or she will have the 
exclusive use of this television: other individuals are excluded from being able to use it, for the 
duration of the term of rental.  He or she will have the ability to allow others to use it, to watch 
television themselves, for example.  These rights and powers, as indicated above, are time 
limited: a central feature of the rental relation, then, is that the individual has no permanent 
rights over the rented item; at the end of the agreed term, the individual must return the item to 
its owner. 
Adapting Honoré’s analysis of ownership, according to which ownership is to be 
characterised as a “bundle” of rights, powers, liberties, and immunities,16 a more formal 
characterisation of renting may be set out as follows: 
 
1. The right to possess X (the right to exclusive physical use of X) 
2. The right to use X (the right to use X at one’s discretion, so long as this does not extend 
to damaging or irrevocably altering the item in question) 
3. The right to manage X (the right to determine who else uses X, and how) 
4. The right to security (the right to remain in possession of X for the duration of the fixed 
term) 
5. No absence of term (a term limit set on the length of time (1)-(3) are exercised over X) 
 
There is, of course, considerable variation in the rights, powers (etc.) that any given individual 
renting an item will exercise over that item.17  Nevertheless, as with ownership, we can give a 
characterisation of the central or core features.18  The above characterisation is what I take to 
be the central or core features of renting. 
																																																						
16 Honoré, “Ownership.” The analysis of property as a “bundle of rights” remains influential in political and 
legal philosophy, but has significant critics.  I do not try to defend such an analysis here, but refer the reader to 
the following central discussions of the issue: James E. Penner, “The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property,” 
UCLA Law Review 43(3), 1996: 711–820; Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, “What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics?” The Yale Law Journal, 111(2) 2001: 357-398; Stephen Munzer, “Property 
and Disagreement,” in Philosophical Foundations of Property Law ed. James Penner and Henry E. Smith 
(Oxford University Press, 2013): 289-319. 
17 For example, some individuals who rent in current legal systems will have powers of alienation with respect 
to the items that they rent: for instance, some who rent their housing can sublet it, if they so choose.   
18 It has sometimes been argued that the project of defining ownership is a hopeless one, because of the variation 
in currently existing forms of ownership, and these arguments might be thought to apply to the project of 
defining rental.  In my view, such arguments have been satisfactorily rejected by Jeremy Waldron and others.  
In rejecting such arguments as they pertain to ownership, I think we can satisfactorily reject them, on similar 
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 With renting defined, we can now turn to the idea of decent renting. This is the kind of 
renting that is required to ensure the kind of secure, exclusive, intertemporal control identified 
above; and that is required to ensure the kind of control we require to pursue our plans and 
projects. Where an individual “decently” rents some item he or she, first, exercises particularly 
robust versions of two of the rights set out above.   
He or she exercises (i) a particularly robust version of the right to security.  A right to 
security, when discussed in the context of ownership, is a right against expropriation.19 When 
it comes to renting, as noted above, a right to security is, instead, a right to remain in possession 
of the other rights associated with renting (the rights to possess, use, and manage), for the whole 
of the relevant term.  A robust version of the right provides a tenant with a strong presumption 
against the owner or a third party taking control of the relevant rented item, before the rental 
period had elapsed. He or she exercises (ii) a particularly robust form of the right to possess. 
When the right to possess takes a particularly robust form, there is a strong presumption against 
interference with the renter’s possession of the item in question for the duration of the rental 
term. Any necessary interference (for instance, limited inspection of rental housing) should be 
carefully circumscribed and regulated. 
Secondly, “decent” renting involves the renter being entitled to make two further claims 
on the landlord or owner of the item.  The first is for goods of a certain minimum standard or 
quality.  The television in question (for example) should not be faulty, heavily damaged, or 
unsafe. The second is for a reasonable minimum rental term, where relevant. Whilst it is not 
always clear that such a term is necessary, it appears to be so for some goods – such as housing.  
The reason why renters should be able to make both of these claims has, again, to do with the 
importance of items for carrying out their plans and projects.   
Since a comparison is to be drawn in what follows between renting and owning, we 
will need some sense of the key differences between the rights of ownership, as they are 
commonly exercised in present-day legal systems, and renting.  Owners normally possess, 
where renters do not, powers to transfer the owned item permanently to another person, the 
power to abandon the item in question, as well as the power to significantly (including, 
irrevocably) alter it, consume it, and destroy it.  An owner also has claims to receive the capital 
value of the item in question, if it is sold, and the income from the lease of the item, if it is 
																																																						
grounds, as they pertain to rental. See Waldron, “What is Private Property?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 5, 
no. 3 (1985): 313-349.  
19 Honoré, “Ownership.” 
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rented out.20  Finally, an owner can, where a renter cannot, “look forward to remaining the 
owner of the item in question indefinitely.”21   
 
4. The Community Argument 
 
Renting more personal goods will help us realise values and ends that we have reason to want 
to realise.  One of these values is community, a value that, I argue below, a wide range of views 
with redistributive commitments ought to want to realise. 
 Community here is understood as relating to the extent to which the members of a 
particular society or group care about one another’s fates.22 On G.A. Cohen’s central account, 
community in this sense requires that individuals in a particular society have, in some sense, a 
“common life.”23  This does not mean that they should participate in a communal or community 
life, but rather that the individuals in a given society should not have lives that look so different 
from one another that they lack any basis for understanding each other’s concerns, challenges, 
successes, and so on.24  To illustrate this, Cohen uses the example of two people, one of whom 
gets the bus to work, the other of whom drives to work in a comfortable car.25 Of the latter, he 
says: “One day, however, I [the car driver] must take the bus, because my wife needs the car. 
I can reasonably complain about that to a fellow car driver, but not to you [the bus user]. I can’t 
say to you: “It’s awful that I have to take the bus today.” There is a lack of community between 
us of just the sort that naturally obtains between me and the fellow car-driver.”26 
 Cohen’s view represents a tradition of viewing community as an independent principle 
of intrinsic importance, and as a principle that any plausible socialist view ought to contain.27 
However, the existence of community is something a much wider range of views in political 
																																																						
20 I assume here a non-libertarian view of ownership; that is, I assume that being the owner of some item does 
not make taxation of sale, rental, or of the value of the item itself impermissible. 
21 Honoré, “Ownership.” 
22 I take this understanding of community from G.A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton & Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 34. 
23 Ibid., 35. 
24 Significant recent developments in property theory have emphasised the connection between private property 
(that is, ownership) rights and community. In these discussions “community” often does mean something like 
“stable community life.” See in particular, Eduardo M. Peñalver, “Property as Entrance,” Virginia Law Review 
91 (2005), 1894, and Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, “Properties of Community,” Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 10 (2009): 127-160. For further discussions of property and community, see Amnon Lehavi, 
“How Property Can Create, Maintain or Destroy Community,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 10 (2009): 43-76 
and J.E. Penner, “Property, Community, and the Problem of Distributive Justice,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
10 (2009): 194-216. In addition, popular defences of renting often emphasise the connection between renting 
and “community” understood as “community life.”  See Botsman and Rogers, What’s mine is yours. 
25 Cohen, Why Not Socialism?, 36. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Note that for Cohen the principle of community is not a principle of justice. 
	 8 
philosophy (including, but not exclusively, egalitarian views) have reasons to value,  for 
instrumental reasons.28  This is because the presence of common bonds, or some kind of 
“common life” is arguably required to ensure citizen support for redistributive policies.29  A 
concern here, however, is circularity since ensuring individuals in a given society do not live 
lives that are very different from one another appears to require considerable redistribution, 
and therefore cannot be required for redistribution.30  However, as I argue below, more renting 
of personal goods provides a way out of this circle. 
To make the case that renting helps realise the value of community, I will use two 
examples of present-day commercial organisations that rent out goods.  My claim is that it is 
renting, insofar as it enables access to certain kinds of good, or is organised in certain ways, 
that helps realise the value of community.  The first example is of a company called “Rent the 
Runway.”  We are familiar with the idea that rental markets allow individuals to access goods 
that it would be very costly or perhaps unaffordable for them to own (consider the practice of 
renting formalwear).  A recent example of an emerging rental market which performs this 
function is rental markets in “designer” clothing and accessories. Such items are typically 
prohibitively expensive for most consumers to buy; however, rental markets render them 
significantly more affordable. Rent the Runway, for instance, offers individuals the ability to 
rent four items a month for around $89, items that, themselves, might be worth hundreds of 
dollars.31 
The second example was introduced in the opening of this paper: that of Zipcar.  Those 
who use Zipcar’s “car club network” pay a membership fee, and are then enabled to use one of 
the network of cars that are left on the streets of the areas in which the company operates.  Like 
Rent the Runway, Zipcar also allows individuals to access goods, through renting, that it would 
be costly or unaffordable for them to own.  Amongst the cars on offer from Zipcar, for example, 
are those which cost above £20,000 to buy new, but which are available to rent for £10/hour.  
From the perspective of the arguments to be made below, Zipcar also has another important 
feature: that the range of cars available to rent, in terms of quality and cost, is significantly 
																																																						
28 The distinction made between placing intrinsic and instrumental importance on community is made by Miller, 
Market, State & Community (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), Ch. 9. 
29 This argument is made by Miller in Social Justice and at greater length in Market, State & Community. See 
Miller, Social Justice (Clarendon Press, 1976), 334; Market, State & Community, 236-238.   
30 Miller’s own argument does not involve this kind of circularity, since he argues that it is the bonds formed by 
a common national identity that provide the basis for community amongst citizens.  See Market, State & 
Community, Ch. 9. 
31 See <https://www.renttherunway.com/>, accessed, 18/1/2018. 
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narrower than those available to buy – that is, users of Zipcar are using vehicles that are, in 
terms of quality, fairly similar to one another, with no real “luxury” options available.32 
On a view like Cohen’s, members of a particular community need to have a “common 
life” if they are to care about one another’s fates because common life experiences facilitate 
sympathetic identification between two individuals, and because a lack of common life 
experiences constitutes a barrier to this kind of sympathetic identification, unless, perhaps, we 
happen to be capable of greater-than- usual empathy. 
What the Zipcar and Rent a Runway examples above show is that renting enables more 
individuals to have common material experiences – that is, access to similar kinds of goods.  
The examples show how renting does this in two different ways.  First, it enables individuals 
with fewer resources to access more expensive goods (both Zipcar and Rent a Runway do this).  
Second, the members of Zipcar have access to a narrower range of options, when it comes to 
what car they are going to drive, than individuals who set out to buy their own car.  This means 
that, in accessing this particular good, they will be having a fairly similar experience to one 
another – or, at least, there are constraints on the extent to which this kind of experience can 
be very dissimilar. Further, at present, we live at a time in which our material possessions and 
circumstances are taken to have particular importance.  One significant way of promoting 
individuals’ ability to understand one another’s lives, therefore, is to promote their ability to 
enjoy access to similar goods and possessions.  Further, it is a way of promoting community 
that is not, in itself, redistributive. This means that a concern about circularity no longer 
attaches to instrumental egalitarian case for valuing community.  
A problem might be raised here for The Community Argument.  For the argument to 
be successful, renting must be a cheap way of accessing the relevant goods.  However, renting 
is only a cheap way of accessing some good if one rents the good infrequently and for short 
periods of time.  If I rent a Zipcar continuously over a period of time, it will quickly become 
expensive.  In light of this, we might question whether promoting renting really promotes 
community.  Those who rent, because they cannot afford to buy, are having a different kind of 
experience from those who can afford to buy: they are restricted by their financial 
circumstances to limited access to particular goods, which others have unrestricted access to 
(because they own them). Despite in some sense consuming the same material goods, these 
two groups are not having an experience in common, because of certain crucial differences that 
obtain.  Reflecting on Cohen’s example of the bus-user and the car-driver lends weight to this 
																																																						
32 See <http://www.zipcar.co.uk/check-rates/london>, accessed, 18/1/2018 
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objection: despite the fact that these two individuals are having the same experience in one 
sense (they are both using the bus), because of their different perspectives on the situation 
Cohen claims that they lack the relevant sympathetic identification. 
This concern stretches the idea too far that the circumstances under which one accesses 
some good or event is the most important factor, when it comes to how one experiences that 
good or event.  If I save up all year to be able to eat at an expensive restaurant, I am still, in 
one important sense, having the same experience as someone who is able to afford to eat there 
every week.  I can talk to this other person about the food, the atmosphere, and the service in a 
way that someone who has never been to the restaurant cannot.  Similarly, there is an important 
sense (which Cohen overlooks) in which Cohen’s car driver, in spite of his different perspective 
on the situation, is having the same experience as the bus-user: of using the bus. The car-driver 
and the bus-user can share their annoyance at how crowded the bus is.  The two have something 
in common that the bus-user and another party, who has never used the bus, do not.  The car-
driver, furthermore, now understands an aspect of the bus-user’s experience that he did not 
before. Increasing renting, therefore, should be seen as something which helps to realise the 
good of community: it is enabling individuals to have consumer experiences which are, in an 
important sense, the same. 
 
5. The Mitigation Argument 
 
Modern societies have become more consumerist, that is, their members consume increasingly 
large amounts of material goods.  This consumerism is associated with outcomes that are of 
concern to moral and political philosophers. 
 One such set of outcomes is environmental. High consumption contributes to climate 
change.33 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report 
identified per capita production and consumption growth as “a major driver for worldwide 
increasing GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions” and argues that individual behaviour “affects 
emissions through energy use, technological choices, lifestyles, and consumption 
preferences.”34  In addition, the waste produced when consumed goods are discarded has 
																																																						
33 Central works on the ethics of climate change are collected in Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale 
Jamieson and Henry Shue, (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
34 Blanco G., R. Gerlagh, S. Suh, J. Barrett, H.C. de Coninck, C.F. Diaz Morejon, R. Mathur, N. Nakicenovic, 
A. Ofosu Ahenkora, J. Pan, H. Pathak, J. Rice, R. Richels, S.J. Smith, D.I. Stern, F.L. Toth, and P. Zhou, 
“Drivers, Trends and Mitigation,” in: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of 
Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. 
	 11 
additional negative, environmental impacts.35 Finally, high consumption contributes to the 
depletion of natural resources, casting into doubt our ability to fulfil our obligations to preserve 
such resources for the next generation.36 
Secondly, those who discuss our obligations to the global poor often note what wealthy 
individuals tend to spend their money on instead of donating it those who lack the resources 
necessary to lead a minimally decent life – in particular, consumer goods and experiences.37 
Finally, philosophers and psychologists have associated materialism with lower levels of 
individual well-being.38  If we are concerned about the implications of consumerist activity, I 
suggest here, then we have good reasons to want to organise our access to more goods through 
rental, rather than through ownership. 
The first reason for this is that renting appears to be able to accommodate consumerist 
impulses in a way that reduces use and waste of resources. To see, this, I will return to the case 
of renting clothing, which is particularly salient.  “Fast fashion” is used to describe the (current) 
state of affairs when it comes to clothing consumption in many countries: namely, that people 
buy cheap, low quality clothing frequently, and discard this clothing rapidly to make way for 
yet more new items.  This, of course, has a significantly greater negative environmental impact 
than a state of affairs where people buy fewer items less often and take care to maintain those 
items, or mend them when damaged. Effects of fast fashion are (among others) increasing 
levels of textile waste and increased pollution from manufacture processes.39 
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 Consumption is often understood as an activity that yields high initial satisfaction, 
which diminishes over time.40  It is initially satisfying to buy a new jumper, say, but the 
pleasure gained from that jumper lessens as time goes on.  This means that to continue to gain 
satisfaction from consumerist activities, one needs to repeat them, and (some have suggested) 
introduce considerable variety into one’s purchasing.41  This can be expensive for the 
individual and costly for the environment. As the example of “Fast Fashion” shows, it is more 
costly for the environment as the costs for the individual are reduced, allowing them to engage 
in more of this kind of behaviour.   
 Consumption of goods such as clothing is often thought to be underpinned by the desire 
of individuals to express and re-inforce a sense of identity.42 We tend to think that some self-
expression through the purchase of consumer goods is important, since we value individuals 
being able to express and reinforce their sense of identity.  However, to the extent that 
consumers become preoccupied with self-expression, this again has negative consequences for 
both individual and environment.  Some research suggests, for instance, that certain 
compulsive types of consumption (particularly “impulse buying”) are motivated by a “self-
completion strategy” in which individuals notice a difference between their actual and ideal 
selves, and seek to close that gap.43  If the ideal self remains elusive, on this logic, then more 
purchasing results along with (presumably) the abandonment of previously purchased items. 
 Organising our access to more goods through rental is a way of cutting off the negative 
effects of the kind of over-consumption we see as common.44 This is not to say that we cannot 
be critical of individual over-consumption itself, or its motivations. The claim is that given the 
present fact of it, promoting rental is an important response.  The reason for this is simple:  
renting is an ideal form of organising access to goods in a scenario in which individuals 
consume abundantly and then discard their purchases. This is because where individuals rent, 
they return the item in question instead of discarding it, enabling another person to have access 
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to it.  Where multiple individuals gain satisfaction and self-expression from the same item, the 
number of items needed to provide this satisfaction and self-expression is reduced.  So too, 
then, are the negative environmental consequences of this kind of behaviour.45   Further, renting 
does not deny individuals the kind of self-expression through material goods that we might 
think is important, since it still allows them access to the goods that they see as representative 
or re-enforcing of their identity. 
 Ownership is not associated with such advantages because, although individuals who 
own items can transfer them to others once they have lost interest, for instance by re-selling 
them, giving them away, or renting them out themselves, they lack any imperative to do so.  
The rights the owner exercises over an owned item allow the owner to consume, destroy or 
discard the item – or simply to keep it indefinitely in the back of a cupboard.  Re-selling and 
giving away items, further, has costs, in terms of the effort the owner has to expend in seeking 
out the relevant other parties.  When one rents an item, on the other hand, one typically has no 
option but to eventually return it. 
 This last point prompts the objection that a more promising response to concerns about 
the negative effects of consumer behaviour is to advocate placing limits on the rights of owners 
of consumer goods.  Current property-rights approaches to environmental concerns advocate 
placing such limits on owners of natural resources, in particular limits on their rights to 
consume, destroy or irrevocably alter such resources.46  It might be argued that such proposals 
should be extended to the domain of personal goods, for example, we might tax individuals 
when they discard certain goods. However, this approach has a significant disadvantage 
compared to the promotion of renting. Most importantly, promoting renting still decreases 
resources consumption compared to a “limited ownership” scheme, because renting involves 
multiple people using the same item, whereas the limited ownership scheme does not.  Whilst 
a limited ownership scheme might limit owners’ powers to (for example) throw away their 
goods, it does not ensure that goods are re-circulated: owners may acquire large amounts of 
goods and simply retain them. 
 The argument set out here has limits: it only applies to goods which are candidates for 
rental.  Some goods are not candidates for rental, such as goods that are rapidly consumed with 
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use, for example.  In addition, goods that are promising candidates for individuals to rent rather 
than own are for the most part those that they are likely to want to have possession of 
infrequently, for short periods of time (perhaps, at most a few months at a time).  On this basis, 
it might be questioned what proportion of their personal goods it makes sense for any individual 
to rent.  However, as will be discussed more in section 6 below, the possession of many types 
of good for a relatively short term by individuals is a characteristic of the consumer societies 
in which we are interested, because of factors such as rapidly changing consumer tastes. In this 
context, it makes considerable sense to propose that consumers could rent a greater proportion 
of their personal goods – and, indeed, we might argue that this is why we are seeing the 
emergence of rental markets in more goods, such as clothing.  
Increasing the proportion of goods we rent, then, allows us to accommodate 
consumerist activity in a way that mitigates its damaging consequences (particularly, 
environmental consequences).  I now turn to develop the claim that encouraging renting yields 
further advantages in from the perspective of a concern about consumerism: namely renting 
does not encourage, where ownership does encourage, the kind of identification with objects 
that can underpin and motivate consumerist behaviour.  
 We are familiar with the idea that people can feel their identity is deeply bound up with 
certain objects.47 This familiar idea is echoed in the psychological literature on possession and 
property: there, it is claimed that objects can be experienced as “having a close connection with 
the self” or as “becoming part of the “extended self.””48 Very similar claims are made in the 
philosophical literature.49  
 Ownership is not a necessary or a sufficient condition for this kind of process of 
identification to occur: children may strongly identify with the belongings of their parents (that 
is, with things they do not own); individuals may wholly fail to identify with goods that they 
do own.50  However, the philosophical literature has nevertheless tended to explicitly associate 
the relevant kind of identification with ownership above other property relations,51 and the 
psychological literature offers us reasons to think that this view is a plausible one. First, the 
relevant feelings of identification appear to fully develop with time, time guaranteed by the 
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fact that ownership implies permanent rights of control over the item in question.52 Second, in 
order for some item to be a target of the relevant feelings of identification, it should be seen as 
“open” or “available” to the individual.53  Where the individual cannot predict they will be able 
to retain control of a particular item (that is, where they lack rights of permanent control 
associated with ownership), it does not appear to be available to them in this way. 
 This kind of identification with or investment of the self in items is often viewed as a 
positive thing, and consequently it has been argued that we need to organise our systems of 
property in order to ensure that individuals can invest themselves in objects in this way.54  A 
natural conclusion to reach, given this line of argument, is that we ought to promote ownership, 
particularly with respect to the kind of goods under discussion here, that is, personal goods. 
However, there are reasons to be resistant to this way of viewing things. 
 The relevant reasons are supplied by our concerns about the consequences of 
consumerist behaviour, which have already been discussed, above.  In promoting systems of 
property that encourage the identification of individuals with the items in their possession, we 
are promoting this kind of behaviour.  In the psychological literature, for instance, having a 
sense of identification (or, as it is called in this literature experiencing “psychological 
ownership”) with one’s home “typically results in preoccupation with decoration” – that is, 
with an activity associated with increased consumption.55  The more one invests oneself in or 
comes to identify with an item, the thought is, the more one sees improvement of the item one 
has invested in as significant.  This is particularly of concern in circumstances in which 
fashions and tastes change rapidly, and in which consumers are reasonably affluent and the 
relevant goods not prohibitively expensive.  Again, as I discuss further below, these are 
circumstances in which many find themselves in the present-day. 
 The kind of identification with objects encouraged by ownership, then, appears to 
underpin or motivate additional consumption, since it generates individual concern with the 
appearance and quality of the external items that are viewed as, in some way, as extensions of 
the self.   Owned items, we have seen above, appear to be good candidates for identification or 
investment of the self, even if such identification will not necessarily occur.  Rented items, on 
the other hand, do not appear to be such good candidates (even if some identification with such 
items may occur).  They are less “available” to an individual for identification, or self-
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investment, because the individual anticipates that they will have to return the item in question 
after some period of time.  Further, the period of time during which the individual has control 
of a rented item may not be long enough for the relevant kind of investment to occur. Whilst 
owning items, then, encourages identification, renting them does not appear to – indeed, the 
little research I have managed to find on the psychology of renting suggests that individuals do 
feel more detached from the items which they rent.56  Since renting does not appear to 
encourage the investment of the self in items and, in fact, may encourage an attitude of 
detachment towards one’s possessions, then, in light of the stated concerns about the 
consequences of consumer behaviour, this provides us with an additional reason to want to 
increase the proportion of goods that we rent. 
One concern with this line of argument might be that it overlooks the importance of 
individuals identifying with or investing their selves in external items.  Such items, some have 
argued, provide important “moorings” for individuals, preserving their identity over time. It 
might be claimed on this basis that we should be worried about encouraging individuals to have 
a more detached relationship with their possessions. I do not want to take a stance here on the 
importance of such identification, since one can accept my arguments here even if such 
identification is viewed as important.57   The argument made in this paper is that we ought to 
want to organise much more of our access to goods through rental, measured against the current 
baseline, not all of our access. It is therefore consistent with accepting that there may be good 
reasons for individuals to own some personal goods, for instance, because such goods are 
important for the continuation of identity. 
 
6. Ownership and Improvement 
 
So far this paper has argued that we should want individuals to rent a much greater proportion 
of their personal goods than they currently do.  However, it might be thought that this argument 
runs up against a common argument in favour of ownership. Wider society, it is claimed, 
benefits from the incentives that owners have to maintain and improve the items that they own. 
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These incentives are lacking in those who merely rent goods.  Consequently, promoting rental 
comes at a significant cost.58  
 I rely here on a version of the argument in favour of ownership set out by Beitz.59 
Society has an interest in the preservation of its resources for the next generation.60  This 
requires (at least) “the maintenance… of the total stock of (at any rate durable) things.”61 
Ownership is associated with ensuring that society’s resources for the next generation are 
preserved for the following reason: it is rational for owners to maintain and/or improve the 
quality of the (durable) goods that they own.62  It is rational because it is they who will enjoy 
the benefits associated with this: the benefits of realising the value of the good, if sold, and the 
benefits of continued use of the maintained or improved good.  Where a rational individual 
rents an item, in contrast, she will “tend to underinvest in the thing because she could not count 
on gaining the full benefit of her investment.”63  Therefore, the more we promote rental, the 
more we may be concerned that we are not protecting society’s interest in the preservation of 
its resources for the next generation. 
 An immediate problem with this line of argument is that it fails to acknowledge that 
rented goods are also owned goods, it is just that the goods are not owned by the person who 
exercises rights of possession and use over them.  If, therefore, we want to evaluate the claim 
that when we promote rental we fail to protect society’s interest in the preservation of its 
resources, we have to consider not just what it is rational for the person who rents goods to do, 
but also what it is rational for the person who rents out goods to do. The person who owns a 
good and rents it out, unlike the person who merely rents, does have reasons to maintain or 
improve the good in question.  Like the person who owns a good and exercises possession and 
use rights over it, they have reason to maintain or improve the good in order to enjoy the 
benefits of realising the value of the good, if sold.  In addition, they have reason to maintain or 
improve the good in order to realise the benefits (that is, the income) associated with continuing 
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to rent it out.64  Even if the person who rents an item has no incentive to maintain or improve 
it, then, the person who rents it out does have such an incentive.   
 Nevertheless, a defender of Beitz might make the following kind of argument.  Those 
who own and exercise possession and use rights over an item (such as the owner-occupier of a 
house) have two kinds of reasons to maintain or improve the relevant good.  They have reasons 
to do with the money they can make from the item in question (they will wish to maintain or 
increase the value of the item).   They also have reasons to do with the benefits that they 
themselves will gain from continued use of the maintained or improved good.  In the case 
where an item is owned by one party, and rented out to another, the owner has only one kind 
of reason to maintain or improve the good.  This is because both of their reasons to maintain 
or improve the good have to do with the money they can make from the item in question 
(through rental, or through sale). The person who rents (as stated above) lacks either kind of 
reason. This, it might be argued, means that we can more closely associate owner-occupation 
(or owner-use) with the preservation and improvement of the relevant goods than rental, 
because even when the relevant financial reasons are lacking (as they might be, in certain 
economic circumstances), owner-occupiers or owner-users still have a reason to maintain or 
improve the item in question. 
 The first concern with this argument is that it has quite limited relevance in the context 
of the present discussion, which is restricted to personal goods.  Whilst society certainly has 
an interest in the quality of its housing being maintained for the next generation (I will discuss 
housing more below), it is not so clear that society has an interest in the majority of people’s 
personal goods being preserved, or that this is what we mean when we talk about a society’s 
“resources.”  A more relevant version of the argument when it comes to these kinds of goods 
would be as follows: society has an interest in individuals working to maintain and preserve 
the personal goods that they own (rather than discarding and replacing them), since this is a 
way of limiting society’s use of resources, and limiting the amount of waste that it produces.  
These are ends, as I have argued above, that are significant in the present environmental 
context.   As a consequence, we should promote owner-use over rental, to ensure the 
preservation of the relevant goods. 
 However, as has already been argued in Section 5 above, in the present context we have 
reason to promote rental, when it comes to limiting society’s use of resources, and limiting the 
amount of waste it produces.  The relevant context is one in which individuals do not, in fact, 
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preserve and improve the items that they own: instead, they keep items for a short time and 
then discard them.  In this context, promoting rental limits resource use and waste, because 
renting allows multiple people to use the same item. 
 It might seem puzzling that despite it being rational for owner-users to maintain and 
improve many of the items that they own, they instead typically keep them for a short time, 
and then discard them.  However, in the present context, it is not in fact rational for owner-
users to maintain and improve the personal goods that they own.  The rise in waste produced 
by many societies in the post-war period is associated with the following factors (among 
others): higher incomes and cheaper consumer products, the increase in products which have 
“built-in obsolescence” or short life-cycles, and consumers changing their tastes.65   In this 
context, owner-users often lack both of the relevant reasons to preserve or improve the items 
that they own.  Where owner-users are affluent and the gains to be made from re-selling the 
item in question are not significant (or not significant to the consumer, because of their relative 
affluence), then one reason to improve or maintain the item is missing, namely, the prospect of 
preserving of increasing the value of an investment.  Where owner-users know that they can 
affordably replace the item in question, the other relevant reason is also missing: they do not 
need to preserve or maintain the quality of the item in question so that they continue to use that 
item.  In a context in which consumers’ tastes change rapidly they may fail to work to preserve 
or maintain the item in question because they know that they will wish to replace it with 
something more up-to-date in the near future.  Finally, where products have short life-cycles 
or “built-in obsolescence,” then an owner has neither the hope of realising the value of the 
good, nor the hope of continued use, to motivate preservation and improvement. 
Let me now return to discussing housing, the good to which the argument in favour of 
owner-occupation best applies.  The argument best applies here, because (a) it is rational for 
owner-users to improve or maintain a good such as housing, because it is a high value item, 
and they wish to preserve or increase the value of it, and (b) individuals often anticipate living 
in their (owned) housing for a significant amount of time; therefore, if they invest in its 
improvement or maintenance, they will reap the benefits of continued use of the preserved or 
maintained good.  For those who own housing and rent it out, they lack the important second 
type of reason to maintain or improve it. For those who merely rent housing, it is not rational 
for them to work to maintain or improve it. Consequently, we should prefer systems of 
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ownership, because they are to be more closely associated with the relevant social good: the 
maintenance of society’s stock of housing. 
This argument is weaker than Beitz’s original version. His original version does not 
identify any parties within systems of rental with reasons to maintain or improve rented items.  
In contrast, the present version identifies those who own items and rent them out as parties who 
have reasons to ensure the maintenance and/or improvement of rented items.  The problem this 
new line of argument raises with respect to rental systems is that in certain circumstances (for 
instance, when the relevant financial reasons for those who rent out items are lacking) such 
systems will fail to ensure that society’s stock of housing is maintained.  
This concern is supported by the observation that, in a number of present-day societies, 
rental systems are associated with low-quality housing stock: in the UK, for instance, the 
quality of rental housing is very poor.66   This is because, in certain conditions (for instance, 
where there is high demand for housing), it may not to be rational for owners of rental housing 
to maintain or improve it, since they can attract custom of the desired sort without doing so.   
Despite this, however, the argument is not persuasive. 
This is because the kind of renting that I argue in this paper is defensible is what I have 
called “decent” renting.  This is renting which involves certain constraints being placed on 
those who rent out goods, including constraints that have to do with the quality of the goods in 
question.  When it comes to housing, we might think that a minimum quality requirement 
placed on rental properties (and properly enforced) would prevent the kind of deterioration of 
the housing stock we currently see in the UK.  Consequently, concerns that promoting renting 
would lead to a concerning deterioration in housing stock do not apply in this case.67 
There is also a further concern to be raised with both versions of the argument in favour 
of ownership (or, rather, both versions of the argument in favour of owner-occupation). This 
is that these arguments assume that we always ought to view owners’ efforts to maintain and 
improve their housing in a positive light.  However, we can cast doubt on this assumption, by 
pointing out that owner-occupation can lead not just to the kind of maintenance and 
																																																						
66 See, for example, Robert Booth, “Hundreds of thousands living in squalid rented homes in England,” The 
Guardian online, 28 January 2018, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jan/28/hundreds-
of-thousands-living-in-squalid-rented-homes-in-england>, accessed 29/1/2018. 
67 There is, of course, a concern that placing stringent quality requirements on rental housing would drive up 
rental prices and/or lead to a reduction in the availability of rental housing.  I cannot fully address this complex 
issue here, but it might be thought that measures are available to governments to prevent or mitigate these 
effects of regulating renting – for example, by imposing rent controls, and by providing other kinds of financial 
incentive to those with housing to rent out.  Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern. 
	 21 
improvement of goods we regard as socially desirable, but also to what we might call wasteful 
improvement.   
To see this, we need to return to the idea, discussed in Section 5 above, that individuals 
may come to identify with, or to invest themselves in, items that they own and occupy.  As 
noted above, this investment or identification with owned items, when it comes to housing, 
“typically results in preoccupation with decoration,” that is, with an activity associated with 
increased consumption.68   This makes sense: plausibly, insofar as we see our homes as bound 
up with, and representative of, ourselves, we have reasons to want to personalise them.69   
However, it was noted above that the present consumer context is one in which consumers 
often change their tastes.  In such a context, our desire for personalisation may translate into a 
desire that our surroundings reflect whatever our tastes happen to be.  The upshot of this would 
be multiple renovations and re-decorations, with the attendant consumption of resources and 
production of waste.   This is especially likely in the present consumer context, where the 
purchase of new furnishings and items for one’s home may be relatively cheap.   These multiple 
renovations and re-decorations, in the present environmental context, ought to be viewed as 
wasteful, and consequently the “improvement” of the housing they aim to produce ought to be 
viewed as wasteful improvement. 
 Wasteful improvement can be more closely associated with those who own and occupy 
their housing than with owners who rent their housing out, or with those who merely rent, for 
the following reasons.  When it comes to those who own housing and rent out housing, it seems 
less likely that they will wish to personalise a space they will not occupy.  Rented items appear 
(as has already been noted) be less “available” to the investment of the self than owned items 
– consequently, those who rent may lack the impulse to personalise and improve. In addition 
those who rent are likely lack the relevant rights associated with wasteful improvement: they 
may lack rights to significantly alter their surroundings. 
     Even when it comes to housing, then, the present argument in favour of ownership does 
not convince.  What those who propose the relevant defence of ownership fail to acknowledge, 
I think, is the extent to which the question of whether systems of ownership will, overall, 
produce wider social goods depends on the relevant context.  Where goods are costly, 
consumers less affluent, and where tastes are more stable, there is at least more initial 
plausibility to the claim that encouraging more ownership is, overall, to be associated with 
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wider social benefits.  In a context in which consumers are affluent, where tastes rapidly 
change, and where goods are cheaper, I have argued, it is not at all clear that ownership is 
correctly identified as the system which, overall, benefits wider society. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that there are significant advantages to be gained from organising our 
access to more personal property goods through rental, rather than through ownership. It has 
also argued that one prominent argument in favour of organising our access to goods 
predominantly through ownership fails to be convincing with respect to the goods under 
consideration.   
I began this paper by noting that many such present-day societies are experiencing a 
rise in renting.  This is something, given the arguments set out above, that we should welcome 
and encourage. However, there is an important caveat here: since it is decent renting that I have 
argued protects our interest in carrying out our plans and projects, welcoming and encouraging 
a rise in renting must be accompanied by proper regulation, to ensure that those who rent, rent 
decently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
